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PRINCIPLE AND IMAGINATION IN JUDGING:A 
CONVERSATION WITH  
MR. JUSTICE JAMES MACPHERSON
PETER DOSTAL1 AND JESSICA GIN-JADE CHAN2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2005, Mr. Justice James MacPherson of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal began his visiting term at the Dalhousie University Faculty 
of Law. During his visit, Justice MacPherson spoke with two students 
about several issues that have engaged him during his career as a law-
yer, academic and judge.3 The conversation raised a number of questions 
about Canada’s changing legal landscape, and how the judiciary has at-
tempted to balance the role of legal principle and judicial imagination in 
law-making. How, for example, has the public’s sceptical perception of 
our evolving justice system subjected judges to a higher degree of scru-
tiny? The result has often been an apparent trade-off between principle 
and perception. What are the new dilemmas in our administration of jus-
tice? More than ever before, an applicant’s right to a principled and fair 
hearing has been compromised by systemic problems preventing access 
to the courts. Consequently, courts are being pressed to be more imagi-
native. To what extent, then, should judges articulate the intuitive (and 
sometimes personal) premise that often lies at the heart of their judge-
ment? The weight of all these issues has placed judges in a position to 
re-consider their role in the justice system, and how they can balance 
principle and imagination to better adapt to the needs of society.
1  B.Sc., is currently a second-year student at the Dalhousie University Faculty of 
Law. 
2   B.F.A.,  M.Pub.,  is  currently  a  first-­year  student  at  the  Dalhousie  University  Faculty  
of Law. 
3  Interview took place the morning of February 17th, 2006.
INTERVIEW
274 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
Justice MacPherson brings his unique perspective to these issues 
from his vast experience in the legal system. He was counsel for the 
Government of Saskatchewan in many early landmark constitutional 
decisions,  he  served  as  an  officer  in  the  Dickson  Court4, and was later 
involved   as   a   judge   in   several   high  profile   decisions,   such   as   the   re-
cent Ontario same-sex marriage appeal, Halpern. v. Canada.5 A gradu-
ate of Dalhousie Law School in 1976, Justice MacPherson has had a 
remarkable legal career. He began as a law professor at the Univer-
sity of Victoria, spent time as Director of the Constitutional Branch of 
Saskatchewan,  and  later  was  Executive  Legal  Officer  of   the  Supreme  
Court of Canada. He was the Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School until 
his appointment as a judge of the Ontario Superior Court, and later the 
Ontario Court of Appeal.6 
***
Early in your career, you acted as intervener on behalf of Saskatch-
ewan  for  several  landmark  cases,  so  you  know  first-­hand  how  sig-
nificant  the  role  of  an  intervener  can  be  in  influencing  judges.  You  
have  recently  advocated  that  courts  encourage  entrance  of  interven-
ers  through  “broad  and  liberal  definitions  of  the  concepts  of  stand-
ing  and  interventions.”7 However, in 2000, Mr. Justice Bastarache 
of   the   Supreme  Court   of  Canada   suggested   the   intervener’s   role  
may  not  need  to  be  as  expansive  in  the  future.8  Based  on  your  legal  
experience  from  both  sides  of  the  bench,  what  are  your  thoughts  on  
the role of the intervener?
My experience has been that interveners often provide an important and 
a different perspective on a case. I’m a big fan of granting broad access 
to interveners in constitutional litigation—especially at the appellate 
level. At the trial level, courts need to be just a bit more careful because 
4  (1985-1988).
5  (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529.
6  Ontario Court of Justice, General Division (1993-1999); Ontario Court of Appeal 
(1999-present).
7  Justice James MacPherson, “Civil Disobedience and the law: the role of legal 
professionals” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 371.
8  Luiza Chwialkowska, “Rein in lobby groups, senior judges suggest” April 2000, 
National Post.
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when you have a trial unfolding, witnesses are often present. If you have 
interveners trying to make their legal arguments right at the front-end, 
it can take some of the focus away from the conduct of the trial. But 
once you get to the appellate level—especially at the Supreme Court of 
Canada—the cases usually raise issues of national importance. And at 
that level, it is highly desirable to have as broad a range of views of the 
legal issues as you can possibly get. 
During the same-sex marriage case9 in the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
there  were  five  or  six  interveners  on  both  sides.  Égale10 was present—one 
of the best and most well-known interveners in our legal world—sup-
porting gay and lesbian rights. We also had the Interfaith Coalition.11 It 
was the umbrella for Christian, Hindu, Jewish and Muslim groups—all 
who opposed same-sex marriage—and represented by a very highly re-
spected Toronto lawyer. Then we had a third group, called the Collation 
of Liberal Rabbis for Same-Sex Marriage. Today, I can still picture all 
three lawyers for those three groups. I see their factums and I remember 
their oral arguments. They were all helpful and good, though you can 
imagine how different they were. 
As a judge, you can structure the role played by interveners. For ex-
ample, interveners can be directed in terms of the time they are given in 
your appellate court, or instructed to only submit a factum but not do an 
oral argument. These are all ways to ensure that interveners don’t take 
over a case. I usually would be more inclined to accommodate interven-
ers, than to restrict them.
The  public,  nevertheless,  has  often  displayed  concern  about  wheth-
er  interveners  could  negatively  influence  the  court.  Some  have  gone  
so  far  as  to  suggest  that  the  courts  could  be  hijacked  by  special  in-
terests.  Do  you  think  there  are  any  dangers  present  in  allowing  for  
large  numbers  of  interveners?  For  example,  do  you  see  any  poten-
tial  of  the  intervener  being  used  to  as  a  Trojan  Horse  for  political  or  
corporate  groups  that  may  not  be  directly  affected  by  the  issue?
9  Supra note 5.
10  Egale Canada Inc. (Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere.)
11  The Interfaith Coalition on Marriage and Family.
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No,  I  find  that  most  of  the  interveners  who  come  in  are  quite  open  in  
saying, “Here’s our group and we want to say this, so please let us in to 
say it.” I don’t see anyone being so nuanced or subtle as to say, “Look, 
let’s not ask permission to be an intervener—let’s retain someone else 
to do it for us.” The National Citizen Coalition was a regular intervener 
a few years ago, and their views were certainly very similar to corporate 
Canada. Yet I never had any sense that there was anything overly subtle 
about how they got in front of the court. They were there because they 
were a well-funded interest group with a clear view of public issues. 
Concern  has  also  been  directed  at  the  issue  of  judges’  conduct  with-
in  the  courtroom.  Some  litigants  worry  that  judges  have  made  up  
their  minds   before   entering   the   room,   and  might   be   overly   com-
bative  towards  the  litigant.  The  concern  is  that  this  confrontational  
approach  places  judges  in  a  role  where  they  become  advocates  for  
a  position,  when  their  job  is  to  judge,  and  not  to  fight.  Nevertheless,  
the  “jousting”  matches  between  judges  and  litigants  are  defended  
as   being   a  major   aspect   of   the   appellate   process.  What   are   your  
views  on  the  utility  and  proper  scope  of  these  exchanges?    
My starting point is that there is a world of difference between the role 
of a judge during a trial and the appellate process. A judge should be 
virtually  silent  in  a  trial.  Our  role  is  just  like  a  traffic  cop—to  try  to  keep  
everything moving. Judges have to make rulings, and that means we do 
have to speak. But when the trial is unfolding and the witnesses are tell-
ing their stories, there is virtually, in my view, no role for a trial judge in 
any of that. If you read a trial transcript, you should not see “The Court” 
mentioned in more than the opening, recess, and the rulings. 
An appeal is very different. The evidence is all in, the parties aren’t 
there, and there are no witnesses testifying. It is lawyers arguing about 
legal errors, and in the appellate process, I think it is fundamental that 
lawyers be challenged as they make their arguments. If a judge thinks 
certain things about a legal argument, a lawyer will want to know what 
those things are, so that he or she can respond to them. 
So I think “jousting matches”—which aren’t a bad description of a 
lot of appeal cases—are not only normal, but also highly desirable in the 
appellate context. I think my adjectives to describe the appellate process 
would be “candour” and “courtesy”. The jousting should be character-
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ized by “candour”. In this sense, the judge asks very clear questions, and 
signals to the lawyer what he needs assistance with. However, the judge 
must also exercise “courtesy”, and listen to the answers. As a judge, we 
cannot be too argumentative, rude, or long winded. By all means, ask 
questions and engage in rigorous discussions with the lawyers, but do it 
with courtesy.
The  perception  of  judges  has  changed  significantly  since  the  years  
when   you  first   started   your   legal   career.  The  myth   of   the   judges  
as  oracles  of  justice  has  long  since  disappeared,  and,  consequently,  
the  public  has  taken  an  active  interest  in  the  legal  system  and  the  
composition  of   our   courts.  The   recent   release   of   the  final  part   of  
the Gomery Report12  points  to  this,  recommending  the  devolvement  
of  certain  powers  from  the  Prime  Minister  to  parliamentary  com-
mittees.  This  suggests  that  there  is  a  greater  likelihood  that  future  
judicial  appointments  will  be  subject  to  more  scrutiny  by  commit-
tees.  How  do  you  feel  this  may  effect  the  composition  of  the  courts  
and  our  justice  system?
There are a lot of judges who are opposed to having a new committee 
system to vet judicial appointments and interview potential judges. I 
don’t share any of that. I think people who want to be judges will still 
apply for the job. I would not be troubled by appearing before a parlia-
mentary committee and answering questions. Of course, there are a lot 
of questions a potential candidate would have to avoid. The main ones 
are questions which deal with particular areas of law, or what that can-
didate’s views might be on cases likely to come before them. 
I watched the swearing in of Chief Justice Roberts in the United 
States before the Senate, and I thought his answers were by and large 
terrific.  He  steered  away  from  things  he  couldn’t  be  too  precise  on,  such  
as the question “are you going to reverse Roe v. Wade”—you can’t an-
swer an issue that may be before you in the next year or two—but he 
was still able to give a sense of himself as a professional and as a person 
to the public and the Senators. 
12  Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, 
Restoring Accountability: Recommendations (Canadian Government Publishing, 
2006).
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Some say that parliamentary committees mean that fewer good 
judges will apply to the bench because of their reluctance to go under 
that type of scrutiny. I say, “Tough luck, we don’t need them.” There are 
lots  of  other  highly  qualified  people  who  would  be  willing  to  submit  to  
that type of scrutiny.
Do   you   think   changes   to   the   appointment   process  will   affect   the  
principle  of  judicial  independence?  And  what  effect  could  they  have  
on  the  politicization  of  the  judiciary?
My sense is that it wouldn’t politicize the judiciary in Canada. Until I 
see a parliamentary committee being overtly political in their scrutiny of 
a judge, I would take the view that Canadian politicians understand the 
difference between politics and judicial life. That being the case, they 
would ask the type of questions that are legitimate for a potential holder 
of  judicial  office.  
Of course, there is always a risk of going overboard, like it some-
times has in the Untied States. Usually though, the process makes you 
feel very good about the people who do get approved. The careful scru-
tiny has wiped out a couple of appointments in the United States, and 
these were good people to get wiped out. So until I see things going 
wrong in Canada, I would say that this value of openness can apply to 
the judiciary just as much as it does to the other branches of govern-
ment.
In  addition  to   issues  of  perception  of  our  judges,   there  have  been  
several  concrete  problems  emerging  from  the  daily  operation  of  the  
courts.  The  type  of  people  approaching  the  court  to  seek  remedies  
has  changed.  There  are  a  growing  number  of  self-­represented  liti-
gants  appearing  before  both  trial  and  appellate  courts.13 Some have 
attributed   it   to  growing  distrust  of   lawyers,  while  others  point   to  
problems  with  the  growing  costs  of  litigation.  What  is  your  experi-
ence  with  this  problem,  and  what  are  your  thoughts  on  its  resolu-
tion?
13  Chief Justice McMurtry, “Canada a Just Society?” (2005 Symons Lecture on the 
State of Canadian Confederation). The lecture pointed to access to justice by the poor 
this becoming one of most serious problems in the Canadian justice system.
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I was a trial judge for six years, and I’ve been an appeal court judge for 
six years. If you ask me what major changes I’ve seen in our court sys-
tem in those twelve years, I would say my observation is there are more 
and more cases in which people are representing themselves. This is not 
by  choice,  but  because  of  financial  difficulties.  
These people are in either of two categories. One category is the 
poor. They have always had to represent themselves for lack of resourc-
es. But there’s a new category—the middle class who just can’t afford 
the steep fees that lawyers tend to charge. So the result is that even in a 
major appeal, it’s not unusual to see someone with everything at stake 
in their lives representing themselves. It is a major and growing issue 
that is getting worse. 
So how do you solve this problem? Our governments have got to be 
willing to increase funding and improve the delivery of legal aid for our 
poor. The model in some jurisdictions is to fund lawyers in the private 
sector to take on legal aid cases. True, the hourly rates that lawyers get 
for that are low, but nevertheless it’s expensive if you are funding law-
yers in the private sector on an hourly basis. 
I’m actually a supporter of increasing government-run legal aid clin-
ics. I think we should look at establishing more professional legal aid 
clinics on a province-wide basis, staffed by professional legal aid law-
yers. Opponents say it will be a second rate system for poor people, but 
I just don’t agree with that. I think we have some of the most dedicated 
and experienced lawyers in the legal aid clinics around the country, and 
there is nothing second-rate about how they deliver legal services at all. 
Nova Scotia actually is one of the better provinces in that regard. It has 
a very extensive system of legal aid clinics all around the province. My 
province of Ontario has a lot more to do in that area. 
For the other category, middle-class people just aren’t going to be 
able to apply for legal aid. Yet when you look at their resumes, you 
see that they simply can’t afford litigation either. Quite frankly, I think 
lawyers are going to have to look at their fee structures—particularly 
in urban Canada. Our middle-class can’t afford lawyers because law-
yers cost too much. Many lawyers struggle to make a living, but lots of 
lawyers don’t struggle at all. They make a very substantial amount of 
money. I think they need to recognize that the fee structure is sometimes 
too high, and drives people in directions they shouldn’t have to go. 
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We simply can’t just go on with our two-tiered system of legal serv-
ices. The poor qualify for legal aid, while the wealthy can afford full-fee 
services  from  the  big  firms.  The  range  of  people  and  their  legal  problems  
are far too nuanced for those types of black and white categories. I think 
an interesting example is what some trade unions do for their workers: 
they  contract  with  certain  law  firms  to  represent  whatever’s  happening  
in  the  private  lives  of  their  members.  This  is  done  on  a  fixed  or  a  modest  
fee. When I hear about this, it strikes me as a good model. 
Do  you  think  judges  have  an  added  duty  towards  self-­represented  
litigants?
Yes, I do. That’s an interesting question, because it’s a question every 
judge faces. Some judges take the view, “I’m going to do nothing dif-
ferent at all, because I have to be absolutely impartial in the way I treat 
people.” Other judges would say, “I am going to give an explanation of 
almost every facet of what will happen here, and I may even step in and 
assist the self-represented person during the trial at key moments with 
questions of examination or cross-examination”. 
I think most judges would fall somewhere between these views. 
They would probably say that we have a duty to try to carefully explain 
the trial process to the person from the start. This should be done on a 
very simple and clear level, so that they can understand the opening 
statements,  which  side  goes  first,  when  witnesses  are  called,  and  what  a  
cross-examination is. All of this should be directed at the person who is 
going to have to walk through the process themselves. We also have to 
be willing to come back to this during the trial, especially if the person 
has obviously misunderstood something, or is getting it wrong. 
Would  you  say  this  additional  assistance  to  self-­represented  litigants  
has  any  adverse  impact  on  a  judge’s  discretionary  independence?
No. If the assistance given is a procedural explanation of the litigant’s 
role, I don’t think that would create any perception of bias in favour of 
that person. Lawyers for the opposing side always understand why we 
do this. So far, I’ve never had a lawyer say to me, “I just think you’re 
playing too much of a role in helping this person”. 
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As soon as I know I have a self-represented litigant, I always care-
fully map out some instructions at the start of the trial to assist them. 
However, when we actually get to the trial, I don’t feel I should inter-
vene. It is the litigant’s job to present their case, and to attack the other 
side as best they can. 
A  second  but  equally  pressing  problem  with  the  operations  of  our  
courts  is  an  ongoing  difficultly  with  case  management.14 Cases have 
consistently  grown  lengthier  and  more  complex,  which  consequent-
ly  puts  heavy  strain  on  the  scarce  resources  of  the  courts,  making  
them  far  less  accessible.  How  would  you  characterize  this  problem,  
and how should courts ameliorate it?
There is no doubt that cases are getting longer, more complex, and more 
expensive. By and large that is undesirable, and steps need to be taken to 
correct it. I’ve never had a role in court administration, but it has always 
struck me how unfortunate it is that we have so many steps in litigation 
at the trial level in Canada. This means more than one judge is often 
involved, so you may have an early motion with one judge, and another 
preliminary motion with a different judge three months later. Then at 
trial, yet another judge will hear the same issue. 
In the United States, most states assign a judge to a case as soon as 
the  case  is  filed.  The  same  judge  will  hear  everything  in  the  case,  and  
that judge is responsible for moving the case. I think we need to look to 
that model in Canada. As a judge, if we know that this is our case, we 
will take a lot more control over it, and push lawyers to move it forward 
more quickly. If we watch over the same case, we will have an idea of 
whether it is too long, too expensive, or too complex. This is an area 
where I think the Americans are really probably better than us. In the 
United  States,   the   trial   for  a  high-­profile  person  charged  with  murder  
will be over within a year. In Canada, the same trial may take three 
years. 
About  five  years  ago,  a  high-­profile  football  player  for  the  Baltimore  
Ravens was charged with murder on the day of the Super Bowl. The trial 
took place in May, just three months later. I remember thinking: What if 
14  See Justice Roy McMurtry, “Report of the Honourable R. Roy McMurtry”, 
(2005) Ontario Justice Education Network. Chief Justice McMurty noted that cases 
are  getting  significantly  more  lengthy  and  complex.
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someone from the Montréal Canadians was charged with murder on the 
same day, and represented by a leading defence lawyer? When would 
that trial take place in Canada? The answer would probably be more 
than two years after being charged. To me, that’s just wrong.
Constitutional   jurisprudence   has   seen   its   own   changes   over   the  
years.  As   an   experienced   lawyer   and   judge   of   constitutional   law,  
what  do  you  see  as  being  the  next  big  area  of  constitutional  litiga-
tion?  Are  there  any  major  areas  of  constitutional  law  that  you  see  
as  being  unsettled?
I think the Supreme Court’s decision in the Chaoulli15 case a few months 
ago is fascinating. For starters, it is a four-to-three split, with a very 
strong judgment written each way. It also raises the fundamental issue 
of how far the court will go in asserting positive rights and forcing gov-
ernments  to  actually  do  things  affirmatively  in  the  delivery  of  services.  
We saw a bit of that in the Dunmore16 case. There, the Court said there is 
an obligation for governments with statutory regimes to protect workers 
in order to make sure they include vulnerable groups of employees in 
some of that protection. 
In other words, if the government is going to step onto the stage, 
they have to make sure that they cover all the groups once they are on 
that stage. In Chaoulli, the majority stepped into the delivery of our 
healthcare system, using the Charter17 as a mechanism to do that. The 
minority said that is precisely the sort of thing a court should not do. 
I think that there will be some very interesting decisions dealing with 
what I call positive rights over the next few years.
There is another area that I think appellate courts will have to come 
to grips with. As judges, we always like to look at the jurisprudence and 
ask, “Is the law contributing to the progress of society?” During my 
lifetime as a lawyer, I would say that the law has contributed positively 
in most areas to Canadian society, our legal system, and the administra-
tion of justice. 
15  Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 SCR 791, 2005 SCC 35.
16  Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1016, 207 D.L.R. (4th) 
193.
17  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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However, we always need to ask, “Where is progress not happen-
ing?”  I  think  criminal  trials  are  significantly  worse  today  than  they  were  
when I was a young lawyer starting out thirty years ago. I think much of 
the criminal Charter jurisprudence has made our process too complicat-
ed. Appellate courts have attempted to make the criminal process overly 
sophisticated and subtle by imposing too many restrictions on the way 
prosecutors and judges conduct themselves at trial. Our criminal trials 
are now too long, complicated, and expensive. The result is that they are 
not as fair or just as they were thirty years ago. I think appellate courts 
in particular have to ask themselves if they aren’t the main authors of 
that regression, and try to deal with it.
At  the  heart  of  all  these  changes,  a  judge  remains  a  constant  focal  
point.  Indeed,  this  places  a  significant  amount  of  pressure  on  them  
to  be  just  and  principled.  However,  what  seems  fair  may  not  neces-
sarily  be  what  is  principled.  I  wonder,  when  principle  wins  out  over  
fairness,  do  you  feel  regretful  of  any  of  the  decisions?
I have felt uncomfortable with some of the sentences that I felt I had 
to impose, though this occurred more during my time as a trial judge 
than an appeal judge. Today, we can have conditional sentences for all 
criminal offences. Appeal courts do try to set ranges for the sentencing 
of different offences. But the last thing you want is eclectic sentencing 
at the trial level. For example on Monday, someone charged with an of-
fence might get a sentence of two years less a day to be served in their 
home; while on Tuesday, another person charged with exactly the same 
offence gets a sentence of three years in the federal penitentiary. 
However, I have occasionally felt that the ranges were wrong when I 
looked at a particular case. Once, I had to sentence a Spanish American 
drug courier. He was a Spanish man from South America living in New 
York and trying to raise his young family. He had been offered $1,000.00 
to drive an old Cadillac across the border into Canada. The Cadillac had 
been shelled out so that a lot of cocaine could be put into the trunk, 
and this man who had never been to Canada in his life got caught at 
the border. When he came on for trial, the jury found him guilty and I 
had to impose a sentence at the end. This was an offence of importing, 
which was the worst offence. It was also for cocaine, which is a real bad 
drug. I knew I would have to sentence him to quite a lot, though on the 
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other hand, I knew that he was a courier who had crossed the border for 
$1,000.00. I knew that he had a wife and two young children back in 
New York, and that he was from South America. So how long should he 
serve in a Canadian jail? Well, I had to follow the range for the offence, 
regardless. The sentence that I imposed was nine years. I remember 
thinking, “that’s so high”, and I wish I didn’t have to do that. 
At the other end of the spectrum was a case where a trial judge had 
sentenced a son to house arrest for killing his mother. The jury had con-
victed him of second degree murder, and I thought: You shouldn’t be 
sentenced to house arrest for killing your mother. I felt that the sentence 
was not long enough in that case, but the law at the time allowed it. 
It  seems  certain  that  the  future  legal  landscape  will  present  many  
novel  challenges  for  judges  where  pure  principle  will  still  be  com-
promised.  How  do   judges  balance  a  principled  approach  with  all  
the  other  competing  interests  and,  in  particular,  your  own  personal  
view  of  what  is  right  for  a  case?
It  is  difficult,  particularly  at  the  appellate  level.  We  want  to  try  to  do  the  
right thing, but we also know that what we write at the appellate level 
will be what trial judges will have to follow. We do try to think through 
what we’re saying in each case, what the effect of that might be with 
future cases down the road, and try to factor that in as we’re making our 
decision. Essentially, we’re gazing into a crystal ball.  
Chief Justice Dickson once said the role of a judge is to combine 
principle and imagination.  It’s tough to do.  Principle is so much easier 
for lawyers and judges because that’s what we’re taught from year one 
in law school—applying principles and knowledge. Finding the right 
case in which to use our imagination and advance the law is hard, but I 
think it’s important to occasionally try.  
Most judges like to think that they are trying to make decisions that 
are principled and anchored in the jurisprudence. They try to balance 
their application of the principles to the facts of the case. You get a bit 
uncomfortable if you start to move outside of that. So we never like to 
say that there is also a personal element present—either in terms of a 
lifetime of experience and values, or our view of those litigants. We 
are  never  comfortable  in  thinking  that   these  influence  our  decisions  a  
lot. Yet the reality is that if a judge lives a professional life before they 
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become a judge, their view of the litigants and their own experiences 
and values are important in the decisions they make. It’s not surprising 
that those will continue to be important when they are a judge; but how 
they  quantify  and  articulate  that  is  difficult,  because  they’re  not  used  to  
thinking that way when they are a judge. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once described this as the “inarticulate ma-
jor premise”. Most judges would say “boy, if I had a major premise I’m 
going to articulate it” and they do. For the most part, what they think 
they are doing is articulating in terms of the legal principles and their 
application to the evidence—the mix of law and facts. But there is a 
level below “major premise”, which may be inarticulable for judges 
in the sense that they feel it, and it is important to their decision. They 
may not articulate it, but it is an intuitive feeling for the people that are 
involved in the case.
This was in my head during the Halpern case when we were consid-
ering whether to suspend the declaration. I looked at all the section 15 
jurisprudence that came before Halpern. I also looked at the reality of 
the people standing before me. The question I asked myself was, “Are 
gay people capable of long, lasting, intimate relationships?” My answer 
was, “Of course.” When then, should we recognise their right—now, or 
two years from now? I had to ask, “Why not now?”
